This video can be seen with full footage here.
English football returned from the international break with its biggest game, as reigning champions Liverpool hosted old rivals Manchester United at Anfield.
Arne Slot kept to the same side that lost to Chelsea before the break.
Ruben Amorim made two changes to the team that beat Sunderland, as Harry Maguire and Matheus Cunha replaced Leny Yoro and Benjamin Sesko.
The game was barely a minute old when United took the lead. A long ball from Senne Lammens saw it headed back and forth before finally falling to Bruno Fernandes in midfield. With no pressure coming from any of the midfielders, it was left to Virgil van Dijk to step up, although Fernandes had the time to control the ball and squeeze it wide to Amad Diallo.
Van Dijk stepping up left a gap that Bryan Mbeumo and Cunha both targetted, and although Van Dijk managed to get back into position, he didn’t accelerate to match Mbeumo’s run, allowing the Cameroonian to get in behind and finish at the near post.
This was consistent with their attacking strategy throughout. They would look to bait the Liverpool press, drawing Liverpool’s attackers forward onto their centre-backs, then pass back to Lammens and go long, playing over the top of the press. Liverpool’s centre-backs would usually win the initial header, but as United had more players in midfield, they could often win the second ball and get on the attack.
As Liverpool’s wingers were forward pressing the centre-backs, it was left to the Liverpool full-backs to step out and meet the United wing-backs, which in turn left space behind them to exploit, necessitating the centre-backs coming across to cover.
Amorim’s tactics are based entirely around creating these overloads and Liverpool’s pressing structure made it easy for United to do so.
Liverpool were trying to create a similar overload at the other end, regularly having over half the team in the attacking line to occupy the United backline.
The major problem this caused was that it left no one in midfield to actually get the ball to that attacking line. Ryan Gravenberch was essentially left to progress the ball through the midfield by himself. All United had to do to stop Liverpool from being able to play out was stay on Gravenberch, and even when the Dutchman got on the ball, he was often left with no passing options as his teammates didn’t make themselves available.
To his credit, Milos Kerkez did at times come inside to provide a passing option, however it isn’t a role that appears to suit his skillset.
Likewise, Alexander Isak was frequently dropping off the frontline to receive the ball. The Swede is meant to be Liverpool’s number nine though: he was presumably signed to score goals, so why is he the man dropping deep into midfield while the midfielders stay up front?
What made this all the more frustrating was that United’s defensive set-up was far from air tight. Having taken such an early lead, United often did the obvious thing and dropped off into a 5-4-1 shape to protect it.
They didn’t do this all the time though. Mbeumo would sometimes push up next to Cunha to press, seeing them move up onto the Liverpool centre-backs, and even when he didn’t, sometimes Cunha would simply do a bad job of stopping the pass into Gravenberch.
If United’s midfielders didn’t step up to meet Gravenberch, then that would leave him completely free to advance with the ball – a point that Gravenberch neatly demonstrated in the 18th minute.
Instead, United’s midfielders would typically step out to meet him, opening up space behind them to be exploited.
United’s midfield two were displaying they could quite easily be drawn out of their positions, yet by pushing their midfielders high rather than coming short, Liverpool were giving them little reason to go wandering.
One of the few times that Liverpool did pull their midfielders back, seeing United’s step up, resulted in one of their best chances, as Mohamed Salah got space to exploit behind them.
Liverpool did have some success progressing the ball down the right flank, having Conor Bradley make runs from deep to appear in attack while his teammates combined.
The majority of the match was just this though: the defenders and Gravenberch slowly passing between themselves, hoping something would open up in front of them as their teammates stood in attack, waiting for the ball to miraculously come to them.
With the match continuing on in much the same way into the second half, Slot made a triple substitution just after the hour mark, completely changing his midfield. Dominik Szoboszlai was moved to right-back, with Bradley making way for Hugo Ekitiké, while Curtis Jones and Florian Wirtz replaced Alexis Mac Allister and Gravenberch.
On paper, this should have been even more open, switching to what was essentially a 4-2-4 with a number ten in the midfield two, however in practice it was actually an improvement. Jones was a like-for-like replacement for Gravenberch, but didn’t have the same issues as the Dutchman. Szoboszlai would tuck inside next to him, while Wirtz would actually show for the ball, meaning Liverpool now had options to progress the ball through the midfield. Even striker Ekitiké was a greater help.
Their equaliser wouldn’t come from any pattern of play however. They won the ball back as United tried to counter following a Liverpool corner, and Ekitiké’s dribble saw United’s defenders scramble into the middle. With seven defenders in the centre, there was obviously little space to work the ball through, but it left Federico Chiesa in space out wide, so Wirtz squeezed the ball out to him, and he squared the ball to Gakpo to tap in, played onside by Patrick Dorgu’s outstretched leg.
It wasn’t to last though. From a corner, Mbeumo’s shot was blocked by Chiesa, only to be returned to Fernandes, who delivered a perfect first-time pass to the back post. Liverpool had already emptied this area out though, so while Harry Maguire beat Ibrahima Konaté to head it home, it could have just as easily been Matthijs de Ligt or Dorgu. More poor defending at the back post punished Liverpool.
Losing four matches on the trot isn’t great, that fourth loss coming against your biggest rivals is even worse, but those rivals being there for the taking, their worst side in fifty years, and still not managing it, is worse still.
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