Marco Rose’s Borussia Mönchengladbach

One of the things we touched upon recently when looking back at the 1977 European Cup final was how Liverpool and Borussia Mönchengladbach were in similar positions. Both teams had pushed to the top of their domestic games and had won UEFA Cups, but neither had taken that last step to establish themselves amongst the biggest clubs by winning club football’s grandest prize: the European Cup.

Victorious Liverpool would dominate for another decade, adding another three European Cups to their trophy cabinet, whereas Mönchengladbach would begin their slow decline, unable to keep hold onto many of their best players due to poor ticket revenue from the relatively small Bökelbergstadion.

After their peak in the 70s, Gladbach would win just one more trophy – the DFB-Pokal in 1995 – and would be relegated just a few years later. Their stay in the 2. Bundesliga was short-lived, however it wasn’t until Lucien Favre took over in 2011 that The Foals would be back fighting at the top end of the Bundesliga.

Finishing the 2018-19 Bundesliga season with just three wins in their final fourteen games, coach Dieter Hecking was let go and replaced by Marco Rose, who had just done the double in Austria with Red Bull Salzburg.

Basic idea

Playing out the end of his career under the tutelage of Jurgen Klopp at Mainz, it’s perhaps not surprising that Marco Rose fitted in well with the Red Bull house style. Quick, energetic, direct attacking football brought Rose back-to-back league titles at Salzburg and has Gladbach scrapping it out at the top of the table in Germany.

“The basic ideas behind my playing philosophy are emotionality, hunger and being active,” he explains. “We want to be very active against the ball, sprint a lot. We want to win high balls and have short ways to the goal. We don’t want to play high and wide, but fast, dynamic and actively forward. This all sounds really awesome, but it’s gonna take time to develop these things.”

Rose utilised a 4-4-2 diamond at Salzburg and has expressed his preference for it: “I’ve always played a diamond when I’ve had the opportunity to do it, bringing in two strikers. Our system, even when we play with all three up front, is something like a diamond.”

This shape has unsurprisingly featured a lot at Gladbach too, although not consistently. “We played 4-diamond-2 more often, but this diamond had different variations,” explains assistant René Maric. “You don’t see it that way from the outside, but it shows that you always have to be flexible. And the team here at Borussia also has a lot of flexibility. Last season with the 4-3-3 there were certainly countless variants as well. Flexibility is a buzzword that is used for something quite normal.”

Gladbach have also used a 4-3-3 this season that isn’t much different from their 4-4-2 diamond, usually involving Alassane Pléa through the middle instead of in a wider role, while their occasional use of a back three has typically included defensive midfielders Denis Zakaria or Tobias Strobl in the backline rather than natural centre-backs.

Despite Rose’s stated preference for the 4-4-2 diamond though, it’s a 4-2-3-1 formation that Gladbach have used most of all, even if this isn’t always on purpose.

Pressing

The major problem that Gladbach faced early on in the season using the diamond was defensive. With their attackers and midfield narrow, it was often left to the full-backs to cover the flanks. When the ball went wide Oscar Wendt and Stefan Lainer would push forward to close down the opposition, but they would often be asked to cover too much ground to do this, giving their opponent time on the ball to pick out a pass before they could get anywhere near them, while leaving their teammates in the backline one-on-one at the back.

To correct this problem, Gladbach have shifted towards more of a 4-2-3-1 in most of their games. This gives them more width in the attacking positions, allowing their wingers to press the opposition full-backs rather than relying upon their full-backs to cover an unrealistic distance.

Rather than completely altering the basic principles of how they play, the shift to 4-2-3-1 has just been to give the players a more manageable workload.

Regardless of shape, Gladbach’s main defensive idea is to cut off passes through the centre and force the opposition wide, where they can then trap them against the touchline. The striker will remain central, pressing in the direction of whichever centre-back receives the ball, the attacking midfielders and defensive midfielders will look to get tight to their opposite numbers through the centre, while the wingers will tuck inside a little to offer support to their central teammates if the opportunity to press should arise, yet remain wide enough to quickly get out and close down the full-backs if the ball is played wide.

Gladbach keep tight to the opposition through the middle so that if they try to play short, the opponents have a Gladbach player immediately on top of them looking to win the ball back.

If the ball is passed wide, Gladbach up the intensity of their press, shifting across to close down the man on the ball, while cutting off the short options inside to keep the opposition pinned against the touchline. With the winger, defensive midfielder and full-back all moving across to trap the opponent, it’s not uncommon to see Gladbach double up on players as they try to win the ball back.

Gladbach use man-orientations in their pressing, getting tight to and following opposition players, but they aren’t too strict in who picks up who, giving the players leeway to adjust according to the situation. For example, the striker will typically close down the centre-backs, but if he is caught on the opposite side, too far from the man on the ball, the winger might push forward to press, angling his run to block the pass out to the opposition full-back, which in turn passes the opposition full-back on to Gladbach’s full-back to mark.

Or if the ball is passed back to the goalkeeper, the striker might push up to chase him down, leaving the wingers to push up and cover the opposition centre-backs rather than leaving them free for an easy pass out.

With big, athletic players throughout the side, Gladbach can close the opposition down quickly and are always likely to bully them off the ball.

Defending

Despite the pressure they exert on the opposition, Gladbach concede a lot of chances.

This is partially because they prioritise cutting off the short options over the deeper ones. Although the shift to 4-2-3-1 means there’s not as much pressure on the full-backs to close down so high up the pitch, they will often push forward to get tight to a winger coming short.

The centre-backs will also do this, following a striker if he drops off or pushing up into midfield if the holding players are dragged forward.

The defenders are aggressive and look to step up and intercept passes, allowing them to quickly win back the ball and get back on the attack.

The issue with this is that it tends to leave the other defenders one-against-one at the back while also leaving a lot of space behind the defender pushing up. Not only do the other defenders not have any cover for their men, they also have to cover the gaps that open up by their teammates pushing forward.

It’s also not unusual for more than one of them do it at a time. If both the full-back and centre-back push forward, it’s not difficult for the opposition to simply hit a ball over the top for an attacker running in behind.

This would be more manageable if the defenders were quicker to retreat once the ball has gone in behind them. Too often a defender will push forward, the ball will get played in behind them and, rather than immediately turning and sprinting back to help out their teammates, they will either keep high or slowly amble back towards goal.

This is a problem that has only spread further as the season has gone on rather than being corrected. Too often Gladbach players will simply give up and barely muster a jog in tracking back rather than rushing back to help out their teammates.

It’s not simply a lack of effort though. When attacking, Gladbach will keep their four attackers forward through the middle and push their full-backs high up the pitch to provide width. This six man attack makes for an excellent barrier when they lose the ball, quickly surrounding the opposition to counter-press.

It does however leave few men back in defence though – usually just the two centre-backs and defensive midfielders.

It’s a high risk-high reward strategy. Win back the ball high up the pitch with so many players forward and Gladbach can quickly overwhelm the opposition and score. Fail to win it back or give it away before it even reaches the attack and a lot is asked of the defenders to stop them from being overwhelmed themselves.

So are Gladbach’s defenders up to the challenge?

The best is Nico Elvedi. He frequently shows good anticipation stepping in to steal the ball before it can get into the forwards’ feet.

When he can’t get there ahead of them, he will get tight to the forward and hold them in place with his strength, rarely getting rolled and often able to poke a leg around and win back the ball.

One noteworthy technique Elvedi employs is making challenges with his near foot. For any boxing enthusiasts, it might help to think of this in a similar way to the difference between a jab and a cross: the jab is the shortest punch, with the lead hand closest to the opponent, but no one’s getting knocked out by a jab.

Elvedi tackling with his near foot allows him to get to the ball quicker than swinging his rear foot around and he telegraphs the attempt less, giving his opponent little time or clue that the challenge is coming.

Challenging with the near foot throws little weight behind the tackle though, so it has to be accurate enough to actually divert the ball or the opponent may simply be able to push through and continue their attack.

The swing of the hips required to throw your rear leg into a tackle throws a much greater amount of the defender’s body weight behind the challenge. This means that even if the tackle isn’t accurate, the leg is likely to form a much stronger barrier to block the ball or at least the attacker’s advance than attempting a tackle with the near foot.

It’s important to state that neither technique is wrong – if he wins the ball, he wins the ball – but there are pros and cons to each that need to be taken into account. If you are committing to making a challenge, maybe it’s sometimes better to go for the knockout blow even if you give away a foul rather than the pawing jab that the opponent might be able to ride.

Alongside Elvedi is Matthias Ginter. The German is another strong, aggressive centre-back, although he lacks some of the slickness of Elvedi. It’s not unusual to see him seemingly do everything right in getting into a good position to challenge only to get his feet stuck awkwardly under him, missing the opportunity to claim the ball.

Neither centre-back is slow but neither is fast either, meaning they aren’t the ideal candidates to be rushing across to cover their teammates or getting dragged into wide areas. Neither is poor in the air but neither is good either: they will often win headers but glance them into dangerous areas rather than forcefully clearing the ball.

At right-back, Rose brought Stefan Lainer with him from Salzburg. It’s clear to see why: the Austrian is an incredibly aggressive bundle of energy that fits right into the front-foot way Rose wants his defenders to play. This aggressiveness can backfire though as he goes steaming into challenges only to miss and get left in his opponent’s wake.

Left-back Oscar Wendt is the weakest of the regular back four, reflected by Ramy Bensebaini sometimes being chosen ahead of him. He’s the worst offender for his failure to track back quickly and, despite his quick feet, he’s poor in one-on-ones, failing to stop crosses even when he gets into good positions to deal with his opponent.

Are Gladbach’s backline good players? Yes. Are they good enough to consistently deal with how Rose’s system leaves them exposed to the high quality counter-attacking of the Bundesliga? Probably not.

This often leaves them relying on the abilities of Yann Sommer in goal. Although undersized at just 6ft, the Swiss makes up for his lack of height with his quick reactions, able to quickly spring to make a save and jumping back up to his feet quickly to make a second if the danger is still live. His positioning is also preventative, shifting his feet before the shot to get himself set, meaning he’s already in the best position to make the save rather than manically scrambling at the last moment.

Denis Zakaria is also frequently on hand to clear up any messes the defence leaves too. At 23 he’s not perfect, but he does possess a keen awareness of danger that a few of his teammates seem to lack, while also having the pace to rush across and cover.

Build-up

Typically pushing four men forward into attack, Gladbach take risks to get the ball to them. The centre-backs will split wide and the full-backs will often push high to provide attacking width, although if the ball is going down their flank they will often drop back deeper to help work the ball forward.

This means that if they lose the ball, Gladbach can easily be caught stretched, with the full-backs far up the pitch and a big gap between the centre-backs.

Nevertheless, the defenders are comfortable on the ball and under pressure, enabling them to draw the opposition press and create space elsewhere or find their teammates with passes into feet. If their attempts break down, they can simply pass back to Sommer and reset.

The layout of the midfield depends on which players are chosen. As Maric explains: “if you want depth, Tobi Strobl is a great option, because he is able to play the long balls right and left diagonally on point. In a game where we want to make more short combinations, you might add a second number six, or if you want one that takes the ball and runs 60 meters, then of course you choose Denis Zakaria. That’s why at this level you can’t say that a player is better or worse, but only whether someone is better suited for a situation.”

If Christoph Kramer is chosen, he will often drop between the centre-backs or to their right to form a makeshift back three – his involvement more about adding an extra man to create space for his teammates or short passing.

Strobl also comes deeper, but instead to find space and pick out a long pass forward.

Zakaria however tends to stay in the midfield, extremely comfortable receiving the ball under pressure and carrying it forward.

Both Florian Neuhaus and Laszlo Bénes offer real creativity from midfield, lining up either in the attacking midfield roles or deeper. The German offers sleek dribbling and clean passing with either foot, while the Slovakian specialises in distribution, quickly picking out through balls and possessing a knack for set-pieces.

Gladbach favour a double pivot when playing out. This is obviously simple in the 4-2-3-1 but when playing in a different shape, Zakaria will generally move to the side closest to the ball while the outside midfielder on the opposite side will drop in next to him.

This means both sides have a centre-back, full-back and midfielder to work the ball forward with neat passing triangles. If the build-up down one side meets a dead end, Gladbach can switch play and try the same thing on the opposite flank.

With their short build-up encouraging the opposition to press and them pushing four men forward into attack, Gladbach can often isolate the opposition backline four-against-four. Combine this with the frontline consisting of big, physical players and long balls forward can often be a successful way of quickly turning defence into attack.

These long balls are perhaps underutilised though, with Gladbach preferring to pass out with short combinations. It’s not unusual to see them pull off some impressive intricate passing moves only to lose the ball before it reaches the attackers.

Attacking

Despite their preference for playing out from the back, Gladbach push their attackers high early. While the wingers will sometimes stay wide for combinations down the wings, for the most part the attackers position themselves centrally. They will move around between the lines, constantly looking to provide a passing option for the deeper players. With typically four of them in this space, there is always someone on hand looking to receive the ball whenever any gaps open up.

If those gaps don’t open up, Gladbach do have an alternative: Wendt and Lainer push high down the flanks to provide width. If they want to block the passes through to the forwards, the opposition have to keep narrow, so that tends to leave Gladbach’s full-backs in space out wide.

They can either use this space to burst into attack down the flanks, rebound the ball back inside into the feet of the attackers or combine with an attacker making a diagonal run wide to overload the wing.

Whether via the wing or through the centre, Gladbach’s attacking is built on quick interchanges. It is rarely kick and rush, but instead quick passes, usually to feet and often one-touch, with constant switching of positions between the attackers.

The set-up helps with this. Pushing so many men forward can leave them a little top-heavy, but with the full-backs also providing attacking width, Gladbach are often in a six-versus-four situation against the opposition defence. One attacker might make a run in behind, one might drop off, one might tuck inside, one might drift wide. The defenders can’t cover all of them as they switch around, creating space for their teammates while constantly changing the angle with first-time passes to make it difficult to track where the danger is. Flooding the box with players increases the likelihood that it will be a Gladbach player who gets to the ball first.

It isn’t simply a numbers game that gets Gladbach goals though: their players have the skillsets to make the rapid attacking work too.

Wendt and Lainer are have the pace and energy to get up and down the pitch to stretch play, and, although Gladbach prefer pull-backs and low crosses, both have shown an ability to pick out aerial crosses that could make use of the aerial threat of Marcus Thuram and Breel Embolo.

Neuhaus, Bénes, Patrick Hermann and Lars Stindl offer comfort on the ball and the eye for a pass.

Embolo possesses the quick feet to be able to worm his way through opposition challenges and carry the ball forward by himself, forcing opponents to come across to cover to open up space for his teammates.

Son of French legend Lilian, Marcus Thuram’s dribbling also causes the opposition problems. He only really uses his right foot so he often appears to be presenting the ball to defenders when he carries it forward, drawing them in by slowing down then knocking it past them and racing to the ball first. It relies more upon his athleticism than the clean technique of Embolo but it is undoubtedly effective.

Although his game is largely based around his physicality, he’s not some big thick lump. He frequently shows intelligent decision-making and he can join in with the intricate passing moves of his more technical teammates. His willingness to put himself about and barge his way into goalscoring positions does make him an excellent foil to many of his teammates, who often prefer to come short and link play rather than running in behind.

Thuram’s compatriot Alassane Pléa is the most well-rounded of the forwards. He can pull off low shots at goal with either foot and he has the pace and ability to make space for himself that makes him a good out-and-out striker, yet he also has the touch, technique and eye for a tricky-but-rewarding pass to make him the hub of the creativity in the final third. Given his best shots tend to come when he pulls back to the edge of the area to await a cutback into his feet rather than racing onto the ball, this mixture of roles suits him best.

Gladbach’s attacking style has the directness to make them a real goal threat on the counter, enabling them to take quick advantage of any balls won back by their pressing, while also possessing the intricacy to trouble packed defences.

Conclusion

Borussia Mönchengladbach’s preference for committing lots of players forward mean they aren’t the most defensively sound of teams, but it does tip the balance in favour of their attack, overloading the opposition’s backline with a swarm of exciting attackers.

After a strong start, they have fallen a little behind in their title challenge, but Rose’s first season in charge has definitely been a very watchable one so far.

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