In a post that has only become more and more relevant since its publishing, we discussed how Liverpool have struggled to break down packed defences this season. What we didn’t really look at was any defensive issues, which is slightly odd given the main story of Liverpool’s season is how an injury crisis has left them without any of their centre-backs from last year.
The obvious reason for this is that, at the time of writing, despite being barely held together by a rotating cast of midfielders and youth team players, Liverpool’s defence was actually quite decent. Their problem was with creating chances, not stopping the opposition’s. This finally caught up with them after Christmas though, as Liverpool have won just twelve points from fourteen matches.
Covid-19
It goes without saying that the effects of Covid-19 have been a disaster for Liverpool. No break prior to the season and a pushed together fixture schedule have seen most Premier League teams struggle for fitness and Liverpool have been absolutely decimated by injuries. The more injuries that crop up, the smaller the squad becomes, and the less time the remaining replacements get to rest, leading to yet more injuries.
Georginio Wijnaldum, for example, hasn’t succumbed to injury yet, however he has missed only one game all season – the League Cup trip to Lincoln City – and has started and played the full 90 minutes in the overwhelming majority of those matches. As a result, playing every three or four days, he looks exhausted, and even if he is fortunate enough not to be struck down by injury soon, he won’t be playing at his full potential. It’s not really any surprise then that Liverpool are playing so badly given the circumstances.
Poor planning
Dismissing it simply as bad luck ignores that there is quite a simple solution to Liverpool’s problem though: have more players.
With the sale of Dejan Lovren to Zenit Saint Petersburg, Liverpool went into the season with only three senior centre-backs. Rather than sign a replacement, Liverpool’s stance was to “be ready for a creative solution in the right moments but hope that it will never come up.”
It did though. Liverpool’s injury crisis has been freakish, with even their back-up back-ups struck down whenever they start getting match sharp, but it didn’t take a genius to work out that this approach was risky. Many clubs line up with three centre-backs every game, yet this was deemed enough for the whole of Liverpool’s squad.
What’s more, only one of those centre-backs was a reliable bet to stay fit. Joël Matip is injury prone, missing 68 matches in a Liverpool shirt through injury even before this season. It would be perhaps cruel to label Joe Gomez as injury prone, as he doesn’t pick up lots of knocks or niggles but instead has repeatedly fell victim to serious long-term injuries, yet you can factually say he has a history of being unavailable for Liverpool. Based on prior experience, the only centre-back that could be relied upon going into the season was Virgil van Dijk.
Being forced to rely on Lovren was risky enough. The Croatian arguably cost Liverpool the league in 2018-19 when Gomez and Matip were unavailable – his lack of awareness allowing Sergio Agüero to nip in ahead of him and score, winning three points for Manchester City when they finished only one above Liverpool come the end of the season. If the margin for error is so small that having to rely upon a World Cup finalist proved so costly for Liverpool, why have they allowed themselves to rely on teenagers still making their way in the professional game?
This has been a consistent theme with Liverpool. You can talk about how unlucky Liverpool have been with injuries and be completely correct – it didn’t take a genius to see that Liverpool were light in defence, but seeing every player that goes anywhere near the heart of Liverpool’s backline get struck down borders on absurd – yet it’s possible to argue they have been lucky elsewhere.
Liverpool’s system has been reliant on their full-backs for years, with the majority of the team’s creativity coming from Trent Alexander-Arnold and Andy Robertson for the last two seasons. Not only are they key to Liverpool strategically, but a huge amount is asked of them physically as they storm up and down the flanks. It’s a miracle that the only trouble either of them have had is some calf trouble keeping Alexander-Arnold out for a handful of matches.
In the event that either of them is struck down, Liverpool’s first choice replacement is 35 year-old midfielder James Milner, whose lack of pace was proven to be a problem at full-back years ago and it’s unlikely he’s got any faster since.
Kostas Tsimikas was brought in as back-up on the left, however his season has been plagued with injury troubles so he remains a completely unknown quantity. On the right academy player Neco Williams has been given a few opportunities, showing promise but nowhere near ready to be relied upon at the highest level.
Likewise in attack Liverpool have had a world class trio since 2017. If any of Mohamed Salah, Sadio Mané or Roberto Firmino were to be struck down though, they were left relying on the likes of cult-hero-but-largely-frustrating Divock Origi, superbly-talented-yet-permanently-injured Daniel Sturridge, injury prone Xherdan Shaqiri or Dominic Solanke.
Liverpool have recently made efforts to bring in back-ups. First Takumi Minamino, who has since been loaned out, then Diogo Jota, who acclimatised himself brilliantly only to fall to injury like so many others, but that took three years. At any point, a major injury could have decimated Liverpool’s frontline and what alternatives they had were either a significant downgrade or likely to be unavailable.
Alisson Becker has been one of the key reasons for Liverpool’s success, but when he’s been unavailable they were left relying on Adrian, leading to them getting dumped out of the Champions League by Atlético Madrid. Fast forward to this season and Liverpool were still left relying on Adrian as they succumbed to their worst defeat of the Premier League era. Fortunately Caoimhin Kelleher looks a capable alternative, yet Liverpool were again left gambling on an unproven youth team player.
It took years to even get a competent starter. Simon Mignolet was getting dropped due to his constant errors even under Brendan Rodgers, yet continued as a first teamer for three seasons under Klopp. The club tried to cheap out on his replacement, with Loris Karius costing them a European Cup, and they only gave up on the German when it was clear he was completely broken by the experience, finally signing Alisson in 2018.
It wouldn’t be quite so grating if FSG weren’t so far from the Bill Shankly ideal of simply being there to sign cheques, never missing a PR opportunity to tell everyone about how they are the smartest people in the room. Would the smartest people in the room publicly gloat about not honouring Luis Suarez’s contract then act surprised when Raheem Sterling and Philippe Coutinho treat them with contempt? Would the smartest people in the room nearly wreck the transfer of a world class defender like Van Dijk by their inability to keep their mouths shut? Would the smartest people in the room only sign some teenagers and a useless back-up goalkeeper when they are in the best position in world football to attract new players?
This isn’t it to say that FSG are bad owners, but they are just as shady and manipulative as you should expect venture capitalists to be, caring only as far as it makes them money. They ensure certain journalists remain their propagandists by giving them access to the club, helping to spin a narrative that they are to thank for Liverpool’s success, rather than leeching off of it.
Whether or not the cheery deference Klopp shows to FSG is genuine or him simply blowing smoke up his bosses’ behinds, it’s important to remember that, just as the transfer committee wasn’t as bad as Rodgers made it look, it’s probably not as good as Klopp has made it look. And whatever he may say about his preference for FSG’s ownership model, he wouldn’t be managing Burnley if they had invested there instead. It is Klopp, his coaching staff and the players to thank for Liverpool’s success, and the history of the club to thank for him being here; FSG are there to sign cheques.
The fixture congestion that Covid-19 has created is extreme, but it was also known about prior to the start of the season and therefore could be planned for. Liverpool didn’t, preferring to gamble that their current squad was good enough to deal with it. This has proven to be a disastrous choice, and while initially understandable in the economic climate, the failure to adapt in January when they were clearly shown to be in the wrong was neglectful and short-sighted.
It took every single one of their senior centre-backs getting ruled out for the rest of the season for them to finally bring in cover on the last day of the transfer window, with their season already collapsing. This desire to pinch pennies whenever possible now looks likely to cost them the breadbasket of Champions League football.
This could be an important learning opportunity; that successful football clubs tend to make more money than unsuccessful ones, so a bit of investment could actually end up making them more money in the long-term. It’s unlikely though: Liverpool were surprisingly in the running for the 2013-14 Premier League title, yet wasted the opportunity by failing to strengthen their shallow squad in January.
On the pitch
Affixing blame does little when it’s too late to fix the problem though. The games continue to come and Klopp is forced into working with what he has. That the most intense run of games came as he was having to wrestle with a family tragedy that would permit him time off in any normal job just shows what a cruel season it has been for the German.
Regardless, even accepting that he is not the cause of the issues, it is fair to say Klopp has not dealt with the crisis well. Liverpool have missed players, but Fulham, Brighton and Burnley would all kill to be able to line up with Alisson, Alexander-Arnold, Robertson, Wijnaldum, Thiago Alcântara, Mané, Firmino and Salah, yet they all came away with a win at Anfield. In fact, while results have only become disastrous since Christmas, performances have been poor for a year, ever since last season’s winter break, and arguably on the slide since 2018-19.
On the face of it, it seems ridiculous to include the season Liverpool finally won the league after a 30-year wait as part of their decline, but it fits in with the general arc of Liverpool’s development under Klopp. They spent the first few years building a squad capable of challenging and learning the ropes of his pressing system, peaking in the run to the Champions League final in 2018, then over that summer added quality in key areas such as Alisson, Fabinho and Gomez bedding in, upping the level of quality that saw them win the Champions League and barely miss out on the Premier League, while also adding the strategic option of dropping off into a mid-block to their game.
By 2019-20, Liverpool had gone from the full throttle heavy metal football seen initially under Klopp to being praised for their game management. They were completely dominant results-wise, essentially sealing the league by Christmas, but they were often grinding out those wins rather than blowing teams out of the water. A lot of this appeared self-inflicted, with Robertson and Alexander-Arnold holding back rather than bombing forward as they had become expected to do, as if Liverpool were trying to get their points while exerting the bare minimum of effort, ensuring their relatively small squad could deal with the rigours of the Premier League, Champions League and the mid-season trip to South America for the Club World Cup.
The environment around them had changed too though. Teams were no longer willing to give them the space that Liverpool so brutally exploited during their heavy metal period, packing their defences in the way Liverpool have struggled with this season. Klopp had made adjustments, introducing the mid-block as a way of trying to get the opposition to open up and play out, and signing Naby Keïta (and later Thiago) to offer creativity through the centre to break the opposition down. Neither were real solutions though and Liverpool were often winning close games late on through moments of individual quality from their attackers, having spent most of the match hoping Alexander-Arnold’s incredible crossing could get them something. You had Mané rifling home a shot against his former club surrounded by three players, controlling a ball over the top on the spin to avoid two defenders, and deftly nodding home a corner at the near post, Wijnaldum volleying a clearance for Dean Henderson to spill into his net, and Salah holding up the ball surrounded by four men, nutmegging one, to set up Firmino. These weren’t team moves but talented individuals winning Liverpool games by hook or by crook.
This was of course brilliant – a sign that the Mentality Monsters were still alive and kicking, doing whatever it takes to win – but that Liverpool were having to rely upon these moments of individual brilliance to win games was a sign that they hadn’t really worked out how to break down these packed defences as a team. When those individuals, continually starved of real opportunities, couldn’t keep pulling these special moments out of nothing, Liverpool stopped winning games.
We have already looked at that issue in great deal on the site this year, examining what Klopp had done to rectify the problem, but now Liverpool are losing games rather than just failing to win them, it’s clear that something needs to change, at least in the short term.
4-3-3
By 2016-17 Klopp had settled upon a 4-3-3 formation to be the base of his Liverpool system and he’s never looked back. There is the odd use of a 4-2-3-1 but it will only ever last a game or two before Liverpool return back to their trusted 4-3-3, based around the attacking talents of Mané, Salah and Firmino. The years following its adoption were all about personnel improvements, gradually building a team capable of challenging for the biggest honours in football.
Until the summer of 2018, this system was built around pressing high: the front three would chase after the centre-backs, with the two wingers blocking the passes out to the full-backs to funnel the opposition through the centre, where they could be surrounded by Liverpool’s midfielders and reclaim the ball if the attackers hadn’t already robbed them of it. When Liverpool won the ball back, they had the three attackers all high up the pitch, ready to quickly break at the opposition and catch them out of position.
Since then, most opponents have made changes to stop this from happening. Rather than risk giving the ball away under pressure, most teams simply looked to hit long balls over the top of Liverpool and attack the space behind them, ensuring the Reds wouldn’t win the ball back in dangerous areas and attack the space they had left. With going toe-to-toe with Liverpool looking an increasingly fruitless prospect, more and more teams began to drop deep to blockade their goal too.
Liverpool’s response was to drop off into a mid-block rather than pressing high, except against teams they knew would try to play out anyway. This encouraged the opposition to play out by permitting them those first few passes for free, ideally lulling them into a false sense of security to open up, then turning on the pressure, winning the ball back and countering into space as they would have done in previous years.
It also discouraged the opposition from playing long balls over the top, by having the backline drop deeper, leaving less space in behind for them to hit passes into, and having the midfield drop off closer to the backline, making the opposition less likely to be able to win second balls. If you wanted Liverpool to open up, you had to be willing to pass out a little yourself.
“Last year, our big strength was high pressing, and then when the opponents didn’t play football, it was like, ‘sorry,'” Klopp explained. “It’s like a dog. If you don’t give him his favourite toy and throw him something else, he thinks, ‘No, I don’t want that. I want the other one. I want to play high press.’ So, that’s how you develop, step by step, doing different things. Now we have to be better in the midfield press.”
“In terms of high pressure, it depends on the style of play of the other team. You can’t do it if they don’t play. It’s not that we don’t want to do it any more. If they play then we should be there. You always have to adapt. Now we have to be focused much more on winning second balls.”
As Liverpool became more and more dominant, and desperately holding out for a point looked preferable to attempting to win and getting thrashed for the vast majority of their opponents, Liverpool found less and less opportunities for those counter-attacks into space. Their entire gameplan had been based around getting Mané, Firmino and Salah running in behind the opposition, and now the opposition wouldn’t allow it, so they had to find alternatives, playing a more controlling, possession-heavy style.
From 2016 to 2021, from the breathless high pressing to the patient possession play, Liverpool stuck with that 4-3-3 formation. Liverpool may have shifted styles massively, but they are still structured primarily to quickly release that attacking trio.
The problem today is that the opposition don’t allow them to do that. They keep men back, mainly deep in their own half so they can’t run in behind, and don’t give Liverpool the opportunity to win the ball back in their half. Liverpool are therefore set up in the hope that they will be allowed to play their Plan A, when the majority of sides won’t allow it anymore. Firmino always dropped off but has come back deeper and deeper into midfield to work the ball forward, while Mané is forever coming short to pick up the ball between the lines. The days of Mané, Firmino and Salah combining at breakneck speed as they sprint in behind the opposition are gone.
The problem is that, in order to allow Mané, Firmino and Salah to stay forward, more is asked of the midfield defensively. The 4-3-3 wasn’t too unusual when Liverpool pressed high, having three men to pressure the opposition’s first line, but once Liverpool dropped off into the mid-block, it looked more unique. Most 4-3-3s are indistinguishable from a 4-5-1 defensively, with the wingers dropping back in line with the midfielders, however Liverpool would keep Mané and Salah up next to Firmino, positioned more centrally. This meant that they were already high up the pitch when Liverpool won back the ball, perfect for running in behind on the counter-attack.
The consequence of this is that Liverpool only have three players to cover the midfield. Those men have to cover in front of the defence, out wide and push up in support of the press, asking a huge amount of them physically and mentally. If they get pulled over to defend on one side, then they are far from the other if there is a switch of play. If they get pulled forward to support the press, then they are pulled into the centre, away from the wide areas, and high, away from the space in front of the defence. It’s a constant balancing act, with the players not only having to be aware of the dangers around them in the various areas they are expected to cover, but also having the physical fitness to race across and cover all that ground.
The midfield three of James Milner, Jordan Henderson and Georginio Wijnaldum in key games was always a sign that the match would be a tough watch, with none of them offering much creativity, however they were chosen because they were disciplined, giving Liverpool a defensive base to allow the forwards to flourish. As Klopp said when discussing the change to a mid-block: “Now we have to be better in the midfield press.”
Flash forward to 2021 and it’s clear the balance has been lost though. Much of this is to do with injuries: the crisis at centre-back has seen both Fabinho and Henderson repurposed there, leaving only an exhausted Wijnaldum staying on in midfield. He’s usually lined up alongside Curtis Jones and Thiago – both new to the system. The teenage Scouser played a more attacking role in the reserves, doing well with the senior side yet often understandably exposed defensively at the highest level, whereas the Spaniard has adapted terribly after looking good defensively at Bayern Munich, constantly giving away fouls. The midfield role in Liverpool’s system is already demanding enough without being made harder by the need to cover for teammates who can’t quite equal its demands.
This issue may of course be solved when the injury crisis is finally over. Get Henderson and Fabinho back in alongside Wijnaldum and Liverpool once again have three midfielders capable of matching the defensive requirements of Liverpool’s system.
The problem is that the injury crisis has shone a light on an existing problem at the club rather than creating one out of thin air. That Milner-Henderson-Wijnaldum midfield was never in trouble defensively but it never showed any creativity either, and it’s a lack of creativity through the centre that has been Liverpool’s problem far more than poor defending.
Each attempt Klopp has made to improve the creative issues has been hamstrung by these defensive requirements in midfield. Keïta’s time at the club has been broken up by injuries every time he begins to string some games together, however he’s never been able to match the defensive player seen at RB Leipzig, while Thiago and Jones have struggled too. Liverpool need these players if they are to break down the packed defences of the opposition, but when playing them they risk losing control of the midfield.
It’s not merely a matter of defensive nous either. If Liverpool want Keïta or Jones to dribble forward and combine with the forwards, then those players are forced to leave the midfield area to do so – it’s a fundamental part of the request for them to join the attacking band of players. That means that if they lose the ball, they aren’t going to be in the midfield to defend, asking even more of the two remaining midfielders.
The obvious solution is to therefore alleviate some of the pressures that come with being a Liverpool midfielder.
4-2-3-1
Klopp has simplified the midfield in recent matches, first appearing in the second half of the loss to Everton. When Liverpool have possession, one of the outside midfielders, typically Thiago, will drop back next to Wijnaldum, while the other, typically Jones, pushes forward to join the attackers. This helps on two fronts: first, the double pivot can offer defensive solidity in midfield; secondly, the other midfielder is given the freedom to push forward and help Liverpool’s faltering attack. It offers the benefits of a 4-2-3-1 without actually switching from the 4-3-3, however out of possession, Liverpool still set up in that 4-3-3, leaving their midfield stretched.
It raises the question of why Liverpool are still bothering with the 4-3-3 other than familiarity. Add an extra man to the midfield and you have an extra man to share those duties of covering the defence, wide areas and supporting the press. By removing a forward to add a midfielder, you lose the ability to get that attacker running in behind immediately when Liverpool win back the ball, however in truth they lost that option ages ago, as their opponents have denied them the necessary space in behind – Liverpool are making it harder for themselves in midfield for no real benefit anymore. Firmino and Mané are already left needing to come short towards the ball to work it forward rather than running in behind, so what difference does it make to change to a shape that better suits that? Two of Liverpool’s forwards are enough to scare most teams anyway.
This is something that Klopp has already used to his advantage at Liverpool. When defending a lead, Mané would frequently drop back into midfield, while Salah would push up alongside Firmino, forming a 4-4-2. This gave Liverpool more defensive width, in addition to ensuring they maintained their threat on the counter.
Even if it’s only used as a short term fix, this would lower the workload on the midfielders. Given no rest due to the injury crisis and the packed schedule, the current system simply asks far too much of them. Jones and Thiago aren’t mentally acclimatised to the system, but Wijnaldum is and even he’s struggling. There’s simply too much running asked of them for such a tiring schedule. Klopp already uses a 4-2-3-1 on occasion, meaning it could be implemented fairly easily even though Liverpool don’t have the time to work on it in training.
There’s no reason why it wouldn’t work in the long term either though. When he does play 4-2-3-1, Klopp nearly always uses Henderson and Wijnaldum as the double pivot despite neither really suiting playing in a two, however Fabinho has played in one before at Monaco, as has Thiago at Bayern Munich. They can both sit back, protect the defence, win back the ball and recycle possession, forming a stronger base than the single pivot does currently.
Keïta has also played in a two at RB Leipzig, although his style, carrying the ball forward with his dribbling, would leave his partner more exposed. Fabinho has already shown he’s more than capable of operating as a single pivot, so could maybe cover for the Guinean, however really this should only be considered as an option against those packed defences that aren’t offering anything going forward that would require Keïta’s help defensively.
The switch of shape would require some changes in the attacking roles too though. As Liverpool’s most threatening attacker, Liverpool don’t want Salah having to track back into midfield every time they lose the ball, meaning he no longer suits being played as the right winger. Whenever Klopp uses the 4-2-3-1, it is Salah who is used as the sole striker leading the line and he was even used there recently against Fulham in the 4-3-3, so this isn’t exactly new. We have already discussed on the site about how having Salah central might benefit Liverpool by ensuring chances fall to him rather than the more wasteful Firmino.
In a 4-2-3-1, Firmino’s most obvious role is as the attacking midfielder. The opposition are no longer willing to open up the space that made him so useful as a false nine and so his best moments in what has been a poor season for him have been when he’s been dropping very deep into midfield to work the ball forward. As a result the role wouldn’t be much different from how he’s playing now anyway.
The obvious alternative for him at number ten is Xherdan Shaqiri, whose case we have already made elsewhere. The Swiss offers an ability to unlock the packed defences Liverpool so frequently come up against that none of his teammates really possess, with an eye for a through ball and a willingness to receive the ball on the half-turn in narrow gaps.
The first major problem Shaqiri faces to his claim for that spot is that he rarely stays fit enough to be relied upon. Like Daniel Sturridge, he is supremely talented, but if he’s going to need replacing every other week, Liverpool are forced into finding alternatives, meaning the team can’t be based around him.
Secondly, he’s not great defensively. The one and only time Klopp started Shaqiri at number ten, against Southampton, he was substituted at half-time. “He tried everything, the only problem was defensive,” explained Klopp afterwards. “Offensively, it was a good idea, but we have to work a bit more on that. He was good, I liked it.” Shaqiri might be a good option for when Liverpool are facing packed defences where the opposition aren’t providing any threat themselves, however he probably can’t be trusted as the standard option in an even match.
4-4-2
There’s nothing to say Liverpool have to go with a 4-2-3-1 though. In this fantasy set-up, we are trying to make only minor tweaks to better suit the realities of present day Liverpool, rather than making huge sweeping changes. Liverpool want to be able to make quick attacks in behind the opposition, but are forced into playing controlling, possession-based football by opponents unwilling to play along. If we have one of the attackers now dropping back to help the midfield defensively and we are expecting Firmino to drop deep in possession, then all of sudden this set-up has gone from having three attackers ready to burst forward on the counter-attack to only having Salah up front by himself. Ideally we want to keep the possibility of those quick bursts in behind, while also accepting the reality that most opponents won’t permit them.
What if we were to instead go with a 4-4-2 then? It keeps the same defensive shape as the 4-2-3-1 while offering another man for direct passes. Assuming Salah is going to be the main number nine to lead the line, we have several options to partner him. First of all there’s Firmino: there’s no reason he has to drop back into midfield, he used to be quite useful just dropping off between the lines or pulling wide.
Diogo Jota could just as easily partner Salah though. Possessing the pace to run behind the opposition backline, he already looks the most sensible alternative to the Egyptian to lead the line, while his willingness to drop off and link play, dribble or make runs from deep make him an excellent foil. Likewise, Sadio Mané’s current role already sees him both making runs in behind the opposition with his speed, but also dropping off to receive the ball to feet in between the lines. Both men could play as the supporting striker to Salah’s main.
A move might also suit Firmino. We already know that Mané can definitely play the left wing role in a 4-4-2, as he’s done so whenever Klopp switched to protect a lead, while Jota has shown a willingness to race back to defend when necessary, however Firmino’s defending was always one of the best things about him even when he was meant to be leading the line. He’s defensively aware, always reacting immediately whenever Liverpool lose the ball, meaning he’s unlikely to leave the flank exposed, tracking back quickly. Given his current role involves him dropping off into midfield anyway and he’s become so wasteful in attack you might want to move him as far away from any shooting areas as possible, a move out to the wing makes sense: he can simply tuck inside to join in with the passing, rather than dropping deep as he does now, while showing off his tricks or making runs on the flanks just as he used to do when drifting wide from a central position.
Klopp’s attempts at a 4-2-3-1 this season, such as against Manchester City and Sheffield United, have appeared to be more about cramming an extra attacker into the line-up than providing extra support to the midfield though. Rather than helping Liverpool’s midfielders, the situation could easily become even worse with a formation change, with four attackers caught ahead of the ball rather than three and just two players to cover the midfield rather than three. Fortunately, there are plenty of alternative options to Firmino, Mané, Jota or Shaqiri for Liverpool in those wide positions.
Before his injury, Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain was a key component of Liverpool’s attack, bursting from midfield. Now the opposition doesn’t give him the space to do so, he’s been left a bit part. His best moments usually come from him making diagonal runs out to the right, in behind the opposition full-back – one of the few areas he still has that space to attack. He could easily be used in basically the same way as he’s currently used, only even closer to where he’s been most effective in attack.
Likewise Jordan Henderson has made a lot of these runs in behind the full-back too when permitted to push forward into attack, and he was signed after playing on the right for Sunderland, where his crossing impressed.
Georginio Wijnaldum started out as an attacking midfielder and was only converted into his more disciplined role upon joining Liverpool, with Klopp recently using him on the right flank against his former club Newcastle.
Still, it is perhaps two of Liverpool’s more creative midfielders that make most sense. Curtis Jones was an attacker in the youth team and so would easily fit into this role, while Klopp has used Keïta on the left side of a 4-2-3-1 several times. They can provide that same creativity needed to break down packed defences, while given more cover and thus more attacking freedom than in a midfield three. Having been used to playing as midfielders, they are likely to be more disciplined defensively than Jota, Firmino or Mané might be.
By playing, say, Jones or Keïta on the left or Oxlade-Chamberlain or Henderson on the right, they are basically playing those same box-to-box roles they are already used to in the 4-3-3, but with less defensive responsibility and a bit more attacking freedom.
Pressing
As previously stated, we aren’t trying to completely reimagine Liverpool’s style of play here. We are just trying to remould the team to better suit its current demands, while trying to maintain its strengths as best we can. A change from a 4-3-3 to a 4-4-2 shape in the mid-block is quite a basic one: you remove one attacker from the three pushed together in a central area to add a bit of extra width to the midfield.
When pressing though, that shape gets stretched much further across the pitch. How can we expect two Liverpool attackers to cover the width of the opposition’s first line when they had three to do so previously? This is particularly important for Klopp, whose entire footballing identity has been based around pressing.
Klopp’s pressing isn’t merely used as a defensive measure either: it’s intended to create chances. As the man says himself, “If you win the ball back high up the pitch and you are close to the goal, it is only one pass away a really good opportunity most of the time. No playmaker in the world can be as good as a good counter-pressing situation.”
Klopp doesn’t want to simply force the opposition into giving the ball away; he wants Liverpool to win it back close to goal. Liverpool’s press sees the wingers pressure the centre-backs while blocking the passes out to the full-backs, funnelling the opposition into the centre, where Liverpool can then surround them and win back the ball. It’s about providing the opposition an open space when they have nowhere else to go, then trapping them in there. “Give him the opportunity to pass the ball, but not a real opportunity, it’s more an imagination of something.”
How exactly can we recreate this using a 4-4-2 then? Fortunately Diego Simeone can teach us. Even though he has ditched it in favour of a back three this season, the Atletico Madrid coach is the man to go to if you want to see how to get a 4-4-2 to work at the highest level. Most of his defensive work has been based around protecting the centre and forcing the opposition wide, where they are then trapped against the touchline, however he has also made use of central pressing traps that could fit Klopp’s needs.
Much like how Salah and Mané press for Liverpool, Simeone would have his two strikers split wide and pressure the opposition’s first line, while curving their run to block the pass wide, funnelling the opposition into the centre. The midfield behind them is staggered: the two wingers remain quite narrow just behind the strikers, in positions between the opposition full-backs and the centre, able to press either, while the two central midfielders are a bit deeper, protecting in front of the defence or getting tight to a midfielder.
Atleti therefore leave a hole through the centre for the opposition to progress through, but then those players can all collapse in on the man on the ball, surrounding the opponent on all sides to win it back.
This isn’t much different from how Liverpool’s press currently works, where Liverpool will leave a pass open into midfield, then have Firmino, a winger and a central midfielder all collapse in around them to recover the ball. Atleti have basically replaced that central attacking player, Firmino, with an extra midfielder to share out the duties.
Liverpool’s set-up asks so much of their midfielders because it demands that they mark both the centre and the wide areas. With one holding player behind them, the two other central midfielders are expected to push forward and get tight to the opposition players, while also rushing out wide if the ball manages to make its way to the full-backs, essentially asking them to be in two places at once.
Even when Liverpool were at the top of their game, there was always a quite obvious hole in their press that was never really exploited. Mané and Salah would block the pass into the full-backs when they pressed the centre-backs, however if the opposition could change the angle, then the full-backs were essentially left free, as Mané and Salah had left them to push forward. In theory, the opposition could bait the press, then pass into midfield and bounce the ball wide as quickly as possible into the full-back.
Few teams tried it though. The quality of Liverpool’s press was enough to panic most teams and even those with some quality on the ball were generally unwilling to risk passing into the central midfielder when they had Henderson or Milner stuck like glue to their backs. It would be possible for the midfielders to bounce the pass into the full-backs before Liverpool could rob them of the ball, but it would probably require them moving back towards it and attempting the pass first time – it’s easy to see where it could go wrong. Taking a touch or turning out would be suicide, so those passes had to be perfect.
The defensive nous of Liverpool’s midfielders meant they could often see this coming though, starting to move wide to press the full-back rather than continuing to stick with the central player, and even if they didn’t, Liverpool defended with such intensity that someone would be across to cover soon enough.
Even if Liverpool’s midfielders did leave the opposition full-backs free, Andy Robertson and Trent Alexander-Arnold would quickly race forward to confront them. This of course left Liverpool’s backline exposed due to one of the full-backs stepping out, but the opposition had so little time on the ball before Robertson or Alexander-Arnold were on top of them, it was difficult to take advantage.
Liverpool’s press had an obvious hole, but the opposition’s passing would have to be so quick and perfect that most of them weren’t willing to try exploit it. Tottenham Hotspur in the Champions League final were the only team to really memorably attempt it. Even now that Liverpool are struggling to match both their previous intensity and quality in defence, few teams bother, although this might be in part because Liverpool rarely press as high as they used to.
Still, Atleti’s press eliminates this potential hole by placing the wingers between the central midfielders and full-backs, in a perfect position to intercept any attempt to bounce the pass into them, while still surrounding the midfielders in possession so they can’t turn out. By adding an extra man, Liverpool’s midfielders could share out the workload, so they each only have to worry about covering two of three things – the wide areas, space in front of defence or supporting the press – rather than all three.
The high line
Liverpool’s biggest defensive weakness isn’t in midfield though. Prior to their match against Chelsea, Thomas Tuchel explained why he had chosen Timo Werner in place of Olivier Giroud: “Speed. Speed. Speed. Speed against the high line. It’s clear we expect that we need it on this level, high speed, and Timo has the speed, and this is why he’s in.” Whenever they had some space, Chelsea would look to hit direct passes in behind Liverpool’s high line for Werner to run onto.
The high line is nothing new for Liverpool, with their back four always pushing up to squeeze the space available for the opposition whenever Liverpool pressed.
The thing is Liverpool aren’t pressing as much anymore; they usually drop off into a mid-block. In 2018-19, Liverpool’s backline would drop off deeper as their frontline did, encouraging the opposition to pass out as they had less space to attack in behind with a long ball.
However, with the introduction of VAR reducing the potential of an error by the linesman, Liverpool seemed to push up a few metres, confident they would either catch the opposition offside or Joe Gomez, Virgil van Dijk, Trent Alexander-Arnold and Andy Robertson would all be able to beat any opposition forwards in a foot race.
This left Liverpool’s backline looking shaky for the first time in years, as opponents were given the time on the ball to pick out long balls over the top and a huge space in behind Liverpool to aim for. These were no longer desperate punts forwards by defenders being chased down by Firmino, Salah and Mané but players given the time to carefully aim their passes.
This is stupid on several levels. Firstly, it’s extremely risky, as proven by the fact Liverpool keep giving away chances due to it even when world class defenders like Van Dijk were fit.
Secondly, it’s not even particularly beneficial, meaning Liverpool are taking huge risks for minimal returns. It helps to compress the space the opposition have to play through, but Liverpool’s forwards and midfielders dropping off into the mid-block already compacts this space. Why squeeze an already tight gap when it means leaving a massive one in a far more dangerous area?
Thirdly, Liverpool don’t even want the opposition to go long, so why are they encouraging it? They want the opposition to attempt to play out, to move up the pitch so their forwards can run in behind and to risk giving the ball away in their own half so Liverpool can reclaim it close to goal. By pushing their defensive line up the pitch, they not only squeeze the space in the opponent’s half, making them less likely to attempt to play out, but they also give them a massive target for a ball over the top, whereas previously they had made this space smaller by dropping off when playing the mid-block to discourage it. Not only are they conceding easy chances for no reason, but they are denying themselves chances of their own by ensuring they have to start every attack deep in their own half rather than potentially winning the ball back high.
Playing a high line without any pressure on the ball was stupid even when Liverpool had world class defenders, so now they are stuck playing midfielders out of position, newbies and teenagers – none getting the time to actually get accustomed to playing alongside each other in a system which requires a lot of mutual understanding – it makes even less sense. Opposition managers are openly admitting to targetting it before their match has even taken place and yet still it continues. What is the benefit and what will it take to finally ditch it?
Conclusion
This season is such an oddity that should be written off by Liverpool. It doesn’t in any way reflect the quality of the players or the coaches and so its consequences should be minimal going forward. There is no need to sack Klopp or to completely restructure the squad.
Having said that, there are things that could and should have been done differently and so, while the season should be written off, it shouldn’t be forgotten. There are important lessons that Liverpool would do well to learn from this horror show of a year and simply eradicating them from memory will only ensure the mistakes are repeated.
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One response
Great article that really hightlights the challenges facing the reds at both ends of the pitch. Not sure if this involves new personnel, a new system or both.