By Josh Jaswal
In Leipzig’s first ever Champions League semi-final and only Paris Saint-Germain’s second, this would be an interesting battle as old acquaintances reunite in Thomas Tuchel and Julian Nagelsmann.
Thomas Tuchel stated in his post-match press conference that he was “5 minutes from losing his job”, showing just how crucial European success is for PSG, whereas Leipzig are a club that have recently risen up in Germany and were looking happy to compete as outsiders in the competition. The contrast in pressure is astonishing. PSG are known for strong positional play, influencing games through high possession and a deadly trio upfront, whereas Leipzig’s positional fluidity and young stars intrigued me into writing this. This blog will cover the tactical outline of how PSG triumphed Leipzig and how the differences in quality really made the cutting edge in this tie.
Tactical overview
Leipzig under Nagelsmann have seen all sorts of formations: from 3-1-4-2 to the “reverse T” (a narrow 4-2-2-2). They opted for a 4-1-4-1 out of possession which quickly changed to a 3-1-5-1, similar to what we saw against Atletico Madrid.
The key feature of this was Angelino controlling the left flank, meaning he could not only track back effectively and defend counters but stay wide and deliver crosses into the box. This meant Lukas Klostermann would cover the left half-space, Dayot Upamecano would come central and Nordi Mukiele would come inside as an extra centre-back, creating a back three to deal with PSG’s forward trio.
Left-footed Upamecano playing on the right and right-footed Klostermann on the left allowed the centre-backs to track the inverted wingers’ runs and time tackles, meaning Neymar and Kylian Mbappe could drift infield onto their right foot and it would be easier for Upamecano to stop.
Furthermore with Angelino pushing forward down the left flank, Christopher Nkunku, who averages 2.4 key passes per Bundesliga game, could drift infield when Leipzig were in position to create.
Kevin Kampl played an unusual holding role which didn’t require him to break up play as such but more to read gaps and intercept the ball with a four man midfield in front of him, mostly when Neymar drifted infield. On the counter or during attacking spells, it meant Leipzig could go forward with three attack-minded midfielders. On the ball, Kampl helped progress play when he could against a PSG midfield which pressed aggressively. 75% of his forward passes were accurate within the game.
Dani Olmo and Marcel Sabitzer acted as number tens and drifted inside to create fast counter attacks and progress the ball once possession was regained. Creative players by nature, they relied on their shape off-the-ball and compactness to win the ball. Once it was won they were given more freedom to attack at a higher tempo.
Once PSG went 1-0 up, the off-the ball shape changed slightly with Olmo dropping into a number ten position to create a 4-4-1-1/4-4-2, giving Yussuf Poulsen a pressing partner.
PSG also like to switch around formations and opted for a 4-3-3 on the evening. Marquinhos operated as a holding midfielder but this dynamic was dependant on the situation. At times he dropped back into a back three during high pressure or would drift between Olmo and Sabitzer as an outlet.
Ander Herrera operated higher towards the right inside channel, drifting between the lines, but his main role was to press off the ball and aid Thilo Kehrer on the right flank with Angelino. Leandro Paredes hardly moved from his area, holding his position and winning the ball aggressively when needed.
Neymar was a deeper lying forward who looked to receive the ball between the lines and do what he does best: dribbling and creating chances through the middle of the pitch. Mbappe and Angel Di Maria would hold the width towards the opposition wing-backs however would drop into the middle to combine with Neymar once an attack was on. If a centre-back went with Neymar, this would leave gaps in behind for Di Maria and Mbappe to exploit, similar to how Barcelona played in 2011. The front three also pressed aggressively up to the goalkeeper, resulting in Leipzig conceding possession with long balls, allowing PSG to recycle possession and begin their build-up.
Open-play first-half
After a few minutes PSG began getting into their rhythm and setting their shape whilst Leipzig dropped back into their 4-1-4-1. PSG had a clear numerical advantage at the back, with their box system allowing the full-backs to get high and wide to create width and Di Maria and Mbappe providing depth.
Olmo and Sabitzer would help Poulsen press the ball if a trigger allowed them to do so, although whilst pressing they had to ensure Neymar or Herrera were unavailable passing options through their cover shadow. This got PSG playing at a higher tempo but hardly anything was won from these situations, which can be seen in the graph below for Leipzig’s ground duels won. The majority of Leipzig’s possession recovery came from their left side where Herrera and Kehrer were playing: less technically gifted players within the PSG team. With this in mind PSG’s stronger side in their build-up was through Juan Bernat, a player who has shone since the lockdown. With the problems he could potentially cause, Nagelsmann used Konrad Laimer, a tireless hard worker, on the right to nullify his ability.
Even though Leipzig struggled to recover the ball, they got their mid-block positioning down to a tee. Hardly any threat came from long balls, something Mbappe and Di Maria could exploit with just a half chance. Furthermore PSG got stuck at times when building up, as they wished to progress through the middle but found it difficult to find Neymar and Herrera, who may have only drifted higher as more of a decoy, between the lines.
Starting off as a symmetrical square, Paredes quickly recognised the space behind him and dropped off, creating a lop-sided square shape, giving him time to pick a pass and an open body shape to pass through the middle.
Once this occurred, Marquinhos drifted slightly higher into the opposition’s half and began playin one-twoss and small combinations to feed the ball into Neymar, where he can be incredibly dangerous.
In the beginning Leipzig’s open-play off the ball was brilliant but their insistence on playing out and PSG’s sporadic set-pieces cost them two goals.
High press and set pieces
While PSG struggled to play through the mid-block, they made the most of set-pieces.
The opening goal for example started as a throw-in, which Bernat won by drawing a tackle down the flank, then collecting the ball to win a corner via deflection straight after. The first corner was taken by Di Maria as an out-swinger towards Marquinhos – Leipzig saw it out, another corner won. The second corner was played short to Neymar by Di Maria, Neymar then played it back to Di Maria who entered the box and crossed the ball low – Leipzig clear, another corner! Neymar played the third corner short to Di Maria, who returns the ball back to Neymar on the edge of the area, the Brazilian winning a foul. In a perfect crossing position, Neymar placed the ball down, the Leipzig defence adjusted, only for Di Maria to hit an out-swinger – goal, Marquinhos.
Within two minutes PSG had won a throw-in, three corners and a free kick in the final third, scored from the final dead-ball: it’s margins like this that win games at this level.
As both Di Maria and Neymar have deadly set-piece delivery it encourages a ball to be whipped in, however the space left to either side gives them space to dribble and combine. On top of that, the goalkeeper and defence find it difficult to read where the cross will come from (in-swinging or out-swinging). This is clearly something Tuchel has worked on and gained a great advantage doing so.
As you can see from the diagram the goalkeeper was expecting Neymar to take the free-kick, therefore sat deeper to catch and claim. Di Maria’s out-swinger travelled towards the near post giving Marquinhos the space to head home.
Similarly to the first goal, the second goal started from a throw-in. This time Leipzig’s. As the throw allowed them to play from the back, Péter Gulacsi mishit a pass into the middle, and PSG quickly capitalised to make it 2-0.
However the warning signs were there early, as Gulacsi was constantly closed down. The goalkeeper had a passing accuracy of only 68%: the lowest it has been in his last 7 games!
PSG’s front three pressed very aggressively and Gulacsi didn’t possess the composure to play out, looking to clear his lines whenever he could. A goal actually resulted from this only to be disallowed for a foul, showing the warning signs were there! Gulasci can play out through the back well but when rushed down always seems to resort to long balls, which PSG exploited.
Upamecano, a very comfortable, promising ball playing defender, played brilliant through balls towards the beginning of the game but then it became obvious that PSG started to target him. At 84%, his passing accuracy the lowest out of all the centre-backs
Overall Leipzig’s set-up off the ball was good but the counter attacks lacked a punch. With crosses closed down and Thiago Silva, Marquinhos and Presnel Kimpembe working tirelessly, they kept Leipzig at bay with only three shots on target the whole game, all from outside the box. Whereas PSG managed five shots in the box, three of them goals.
The switch to 3-5-2 in the second half with Emil Forsberg and Patrik Schick coming on helped, as both helped the team creatively. Schick even had a 100% accuracy for forward, lateral and back passes, as well as Forsberg creating two shooting opportunities.
They even pressed better in their new shape, recovering the ball higher up the field in the second half. Unfortunately they didn’t have a player that could step up, put away half-chances and create special moments like PSG. Maybe if Timo Werner was still at the club the game could have panned out slightly differently. PSG showed in this game possession wins football matches, even if you don’t need to penetrate consistently. Counter-pressing and being switched on in the transitions really made the difference on the night.
You can read more from Josh on his blog The Gaffer Josh or follow him on Twitter.
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