When Philippe Coutinho left Liverpool for Barcelona, the general feeling among Liverpool’s fanbase was one of panic. Outside, this reaction was often met by bemusement: why be so bothered about the loss of a player you are getting silly money for and who doesn’t even fit easily into Jurgen Klopp’s tactics?
For example, Michael Cox pointed out that “One of the few players who didn’t suit Klopp’s new 4-3-3 was Coutinho – not a left winger, not quite a central midfielder either… Coutinho was no longer Liverpool’s star attraction. The side’s key attacking weapons were now [Sadio] Mané and [Mohamed] Salah“.
In the short term, they were proved right. Barcelona’s desperation to find a quick replacement for Neymar meant they spent a fortune on Coutinho, which allowed Liverpool to bring in Virgil van Dijk and Alisson Becker, arguably their two most important players.
Liverpool had also unknowingly already bought a replacement that summer when Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain was signed from Arsenal. He was slowly bled into the team in the first half of the 2017-18 season and exploded into the starting eleven as Liverpool made their run to the Champions League final. He not only provided the creativity through the middle that Coutinho had but did it in a way more in fitting with Jurgen Klopp’s vision. Coutinho would slow down attacks by putting his foot on the ball, whereas Oxlade-Chamberlain was all direct running, pulling opposition defenders across to open up space for Salah, Mané or Roberto Firmino.
In the long term though, those concerns about letting Coutinho go have been proven right – albeit three years late and less disastrously than imagined.
The immediate issue was the loss of Oxlade-Chamberlain. The midfielder suffered a serious knee injury in the first leg of Liverpool’s Champions League semi-final against Roma, putting him out for a year. Who was going to offer creativity through the middle in his absence?
Liverpool first looked to sign Nabil Fekir, only for the move to fall through thanks to concerns over his history of knee injuries and his brother-in-law supposedly turning up at the eleventh hour to claim commission on the transfer without Fekir knowing.
Liverpool were successful in their pursuit of Naby Keïta though. The Guinean looked the perfect fit for Liverpool at RB Leipzig, however in reality he’s struggled, both to match the physicality required to defend in the Premier League and with nagging injuries constantly interrupting any consistency he starts to build up.
Liverpool look to the flanks
Without an obvious replacement to Oxlade-Chamberlain, Liverpool instead moved their creative focus out wide to the full-backs. The defensive turnaround of Liverpool in 2017-18 was all pinned on the purchase of Van Dijk, however that ignores the development of Andy Robertson and Trent Alexander-Arnold – the pair bedded into the side over the first half of the season just like Oxlade-Chamberlain. Within a year, Liverpool’s first choice defence went from Simon Mignolet/Loris Karius – James Milner – Dejan Lovren – Joël Matip – Nathaniel Clyne to Alisson – Robertson – Van Dijk – Joe Gomez – Alexander-Arnold.
This saw not only a massive improvement defensively, but in attack too. Robertson’s endless stamina means he’s always an option overlapping on the left, drilling low crosses across the face of goal, while only Kevin De Bruyne can compete with Alexander-Arnold’s crossing ability, seemingly capable of curving the ball out of the reach of the defenders to an attacker at will.
Liverpool’s midfield became more about providing defensive solidity through the centre than creativity, allowing the full-backs the freedom to feed the attackers.
A change of direction
Nevertheless, despite how key he was to Liverpool’s run to the 2018 Champions League final, Oxlade-Chamberlain has never hit those heights again since his return. Part of this has been his injury struggles, damaging his ankle ligaments in the Club World Cup final against Flamengo, then suffering another knee injury in pre-season this year. However, he’s also been the victim of a wider change at Liverpool; he couldn’t simply just slot back into his previous rushing role from midfield because Liverpool didn’t play that way anymore.
Liverpool were at their most exciting in 2017-18, but they also finished fourth and trophyless. Klopp’s heavy metal football blasted through enough teams that many simply refused to play. His assertion that “no playmaker in the world can be as good as a good counter-pressing situation” was true enough that many teams simply hoofed the ball away as soon as they got it rather than giving Liverpool a chance to press. The change in defensive personnel stopped Liverpool leaking goals from these balls in behind, but the creative issues it posed remained: Liverpool were winning the ball in their own half rather than near the opposition box.
To adapt, Klopp made defensive changes analysed in more detail here. To encourage the opposition to play out, they generally dropped off into a mid-block, only really pressing high against teams they knew would try to pass out. By ceding that first area of the pitch, they allowed the opposition to start playing out, then engaged them once they had opened up. By dropping off into a more compact shape, they also discouraged the opposition from going long by ensuring Liverpool players would be in position to surround any aerial challenge and win the second ball.
This made Liverpool less exciting, but it, along with the key signing of Alisson, ushered in a European Cup victory and an incredibly close title challenge. “Last year, our big strength was high pressing, and then when the opponents didn’t play football, it was like, ‘sorry,'” Klopp explained. “It’s like a dog. If you don’t give him his favourite toy and throw him something else, he thinks, ‘No, I don’t want that. I want the other one. I want to play high press.’ So, that’s how you develop, step by step, doing different things. Now we have to be better in the midfield press.”
What did they do about those who still refused to play along though? Well, not a lot actually. They would typically try to blunt force their way through. Robertson and Alexander-Arnold would whip in a lot of crosses and, with their quality, particularly the latter’s, they would frequently find a Liverpool player to finish as the attackers flooded the box. Crossing into a box full of opposition defenders, generally much larger than Mané, Salah and Firmino, was often more a war of attrition than a fool-proof plan though. More than once, Liverpool were left relying on one of their attackers to come up with something out of nothing to win rather than some quality pattern of play.
Liverpool’s refusal to settle for anything less than a win when things weren’t going their way saw Klopp dub them “Mentality Monsters“, but, while they didn’t drop many points, draws against the likes of West Ham who had their wingers track Liverpool’s full-backs, forming a back six, cost them the league.
Liverpool’s new focus on the midfield press didn’t help either. It required defensive discipline from the midfield that limited the game time of players like Keïta even when fit.
As Liverpool looked more and more invincible, more and more teams took to this strategy for the 2019-20 season. Liverpool accumulated an incredible lead in the league, but the performances themselves were arguably worse than the previous year, relying on moments of magic from their attackers every other game. They often looked like they were doing the absolute minimum required to get through a game to conserve energy, and it was hard to argue with as they claimed their first league title in thirty years. In two years, Liverpool had gone from heavy metal football to meticulous proponents of game management.
A year later and Liverpool are still struggling to break down these packed defences though. More importantly, it’s now costing them points. So why hasn’t this been fixed?
Thiago Alcântara
The answer is that the attempt has been made but it hasn’t worked yet. Keïta was brought in to provide this creativity although, for various reasons already outlined, hasn’t been able to do so consistently.
Unable to depend on him, Liverpool looked elsewhere. They settled upon a player that didn’t fit at all with their usual transfer model: Thiago Alcântara. Aged 29 with a long injury record, his signing seemed unlikely with FSG having to sanction it.
Klopp has more than earned a bit of trust though, so the unlikely became reality as Thiago arrived at Liverpool just weeks after leading Bayern Munich to a treble – albeit no doubt aided by him only having one year left on his contract, enabling Liverpool to get him at a knockdown price.
Making his debut as a substitute at half-time against Chelsea, Thiago immediately displayed what his game is about, completing more successful passes in 45 minutes than any other player since Opta began recording passing data.
This was the player that made Pep Guardiola demand “Thiago oder nichts” – Thiago or nothing – when he joined Bayern Munich. The crown jewel of La Masia, the heir to Xavi Hernandez, the kind of player so missed at Barcelona that they spend over a hundred million on Coutinho and win Liverpool a European Cup and Premier League.
When Coutinho left, Liverpool were still in their heavy metal phase. Now the opposition won’t give them the space to play like that anymore, so they are back needing a Coutinho type – someone willing to put his foot on the ball, slow down the play and pick out a pass. Thiago was an obvious choice.
With his head on a swivel, Thiago is always aware of his surroundings and has a comfort on the ball that means he can turn out under pressure. This makes him perfect for relieving pressure on his teammates – an easy recipient if things are getting a little hairy – and you can often see him directing the man on the ball where to play it.
What really sets him apart is his passing though. He has such a beautiful technique that you could watch him play five yard horizontal passes all afternoon and come out wanting more, and the vision to actually make use of it.
He also has a useful habit of disguising his passes, shaping his body as if he’s going to play one way, tricking the opposition into moving in that direction, then cutting across himself to play a pass at a right angle to where he’s facing.
The argument for not signing Thiago was supported in just his second game though. He was clattered by Richarlison late on in the Merseyside derby, earning the Brazilian a red card. Thiago finished the game but damage to his knee ensured he missed the next two and a half months, reappearing only this week for a late cameo against Newcastle. Thiago is exactly what Liverpool need to break down stubborn defences, but he’s useless if he’s unavailable as he has been for the majority of the season.
Likewise, Keïta has spells where he seems the solution to this problem, only to be ruled out of the next game through injury.
Alternatives in midfield
In their absence, creative midfield duties have typically fallen to Curtis Jones. The young Scouser has taken full advantage of the chances Liverpool’s injury woes have afforded him, settling into the first team and truly establishing himself with a starring performance against Tottenham Hotspur.
Used to playing further up in attack for the reserves, he’s comfortable under pressure and has an eye for a pass, meaning it’s him who Liverpool have often turned to to progress the ball through the centre, playing one-twos with the forwards.
At 19, he’s not the finished article though. His dribbling is good but his tendency to only use his right foot makes it hard for him to change direction and the ball can sometimes get stuck under him. Additionally, although his history as a more attacking player has benefits in terms of receiving the ball under pressure and turning out, he can be left looking a little lost defensively at times.
Jones has impressed, but he shouldn’t be expected to be finding ways through blocks of eight defenders by himself.
Another former attacking midfielder, Georginio Wijnaldum is superb at protecting the ball under pressure, however watch him closely and it’s startling how rarely he makes a forward pass. This ignores that his comfort on the ball and positioning open up space for his teammates and that he’s typically there to control the midfield rather than take risks, but against teams who don’t look to close him down or happily hand over control to Liverpool, he doesn’t offer a great deal from an attacking perspective.
Jordan Henderson’s hard running earns him plaudits, so the selfless work he’s done to adapt to Liverpool’s strategic needs flies under the radar. Liverpool’s captain arrived at the club as a box-to-box midfielder, but he transformed his game to fit in at the base of the midfield when Liverpool needed him there.
As discussed in more detail in our look at Gareth Southgate’s England, he’s not very comfortable receiving the ball with his back to goal though.
To get around this problem, Henderson has taken to dropping into the backline. This allows him to receive the ball facing play, enabling him to use his passing range to pick out balls in behind or raking passes wide.
Packed defences don’t leave enough space in behind for the balls over the top and those cross-field balls are less dangerous. What Liverpool need are tight passes along the ground through the middle, which Henderson rarely provides.
Fabinho is more capable at these passes than might be expected, but is still primarily a defensive player. He’s also been shunted to centre-back this season to cover Liverpool’s injury crisis.
Likewise, James Milner has made appearances in defence to cover for an injury to Alexander-Arnold, only featuring sporadically in midfield. A rare start against Newcastle showed why: his crossing is good but he doesn’t have the ability to pick out through balls in midfield and no longer has the pace to beat a man.
Oxlade-Chamberlain, previously key to Liverpool’s attack, now plays a bit part. His main attacking threat was direct runs through the middle, but to do that he requires space that isn’t there against a low block.
He’s instead been more useful in wide areas, making runs behind the full-back – a role Henderson has also played well when moved forward. It rarely offers any answer to Liverpool’s need to break down the opposition through the middle though, especially when they already have Alexander-Arnold and Robertson to supply from out wide.
Attack
Unable to rely on a supply on midfield, Liverpool’s attack have to solve the problem themselves.
Having endured a goal drought last season, Firmino’s overall form dipped at the beginning of this year, although he has picked up again recently. He’s been hit harder than most by the opposition sitting deep, as much of what made him so great has been lost. Before, he would drop off into space, pulling defenders up with him, opening up gaps for his teammates to exploit; now there’s less space for him to drop into and the opposition centre-backs are less willing to follow him.
Firmino is a world class false nine, but, in how the opposition defenders react to him, when coming up against a low block he becomes less of a false nine and more of a standard attacking midfielder. He finds pockets of space to pick up the ball in and has the technical ability to combine using quick passes with Mané and Salah.
He’s a great dribbler when facing play, possessing a highlight reel full of fantastic trickery, but he typically receives the ball with his back to goal. This body shape means he’s rarely in a position to turn quickly and play a through ball into his teammates, but instead laying it off with more simple passes. These combinations do help Liverpool to break down low blocks, yet they aren’t really a breakthrough in themselves – they don’t cut through that final defensive line.
The lack of creativity in Liverpool’s midfield means Firmino has also often been dragged back very deep to help them work the ball into attack, leaving space that Jones can push up into. This helps Liverpool progress the ball and gives Firmino lots of touches, however it removes him from the attack too – hardly ideal for breaking down the opposition defence.
Firmino may not be a typical number nine, but he is still still nominally the central attacker and so it’s to him that a lot of the chances and crosses fall. This worked fine previously, but when he lost his scoring touch last season this became a problem. You want your chances falling to players who are likely to score them, and that ceased being Firmino.
Although Firmino may wear the number nine, it’s actually Salah who leads Liverpool’s line. When Firmino pulled a defender out of the backline or Oxlade-Chamberlain forced one out to meet him, it was Salah who would typically make a run into the gap he left, and it was Salah racing in behind that Liverpool would aim for with their passes over the top. Now with defenders not stepping out and leaving less space behind them, he has found it harder.
The Egyptian is willing to drop off into pockets of space or pull out to the flank to get on the ball and has the neat feet to combine with his attacking teammates in tight spaces, but Salah is Liverpool’s deadliest finisher – he needs chances and Liverpool have struggled to provide him with a real supply. Despite topping the goalscoring charts, he’s taken nine less shots than Harry Kane and thirteen less than Patrick Bamford.
Whereas Firmino and Salah have struggled to adjust to Liverpool’s new reality, Mané has flourished. The Senegalese was Liverpool’s best player in their title victory when previously he was the most easily forgotten of Liverpool’s attacking trio.
With the signing of Salah, Mané stopped being the man expected to run in behind and instead was given a freer role on the left. He could still run into the gaps that Firmino opened up, but he never possessed the finishing ability of the Egyptian anyway, so giving him more encouragement to instead come short and pick up the ball in pockets of space was a better use of his talents.
The Senegalese is capable of incredibly quick turns, so, even if he receives the ball with his back to goal like Firmino, he can twist around and run at defenders. As well as having the close control to work in tight spaces, he’s also able to go both down the outside or cut inside, making it near impossible for defenders to predict what he’s going to do. He can hit the byline and pull the ball back or he can burst through the middle and play a one-two with a teammate.
Alternatively, he can cut inside onto his stronger right foot and fire a shot at goal. He’s not as consistent a finisher as Salah but he’s still very dangerous, managing at least twenty goals in each of his last three seasons.
Alternatives in attack
Young and able to fill in for across all of Liverpool’s frontline, the signing of Diogo Jota this summer was seen as raising the quality of their backup options. Instead, particularly as Firmino struggled for form, the Portuguese became key to Liverpool’s attack in the opening stages of the season.
Jota can come short to pick up the ball, dribbling or exchanging passes with his teammates in what little space the opposition give them, or he can run in behind and finish with either foot.
His rapid acceleration means he can pop up in areas before defenders even realise he’s there, sprinting away from his marker into any gaps that open up.
The excellent form of Jota raised questions over whether he should replace Firmino in Liverpool’s starting eleven. An injury that’s ruled him out for the winter killed this debate – removing yet another option for Liverpool to break down opposition defences – and Firmino’s form has picked up again in his absence. For that brief window, Klopp opted to compromise though, starting them both in a 4-2-3-1.
His go-to formation at Borussia Dortmund, Klopp turned to a 4-2-3-1 at the start of the 2018-19 season, but has only used it for the odd game since. His brief foray this season allowed him to play all four of his attackers, however neither match really showed how it would change Liverpool’s ability to break down a low block. Their clash with Manchester City was an even game where neither team really wanted to risk pushing for a win, while against Sheffield United they stuck to whipping in crosses from the right.
It doesn’t help that every time Klopp opts for it he picks Henderson and Wijnaldum in the double pivot. Neither of them will make those passes into the attackers between the lines, although they will form a solid defensive base.
This is important to consider as by adding an extra attacker, Liverpool remove a man from the midfield which asks the two remaining ones to each cover more ground. Keïta played in the double pivot of a 4-2-3-1 at RB Leipzig, but as he’s struggling with the defensive requirements in the 4-3-3 it’s unlikely Klopp will trust him with even more demands.
Fabinho played in a midfield two at Monaco and is a natural defensive player. He might even benefit defensively from a change in shape, only having to cover one side with a partner next to him rather than the width of the pitch behind two others.
Likewise, Thiago regularly played in a two at Bayern. He solves Liverpool’s passing problem however he’s also defensively competent, averaging more tackles per 90 minutes than Milner, Wijnaldum and Oxlade-Chamberlain last season and more interceptions than any of Liverpool’s midfielders. How that would translate to Liverpool is unknown though – after all, Keïta was a defensive marvel in the Bundesliga but has struggled since his transfer.
Perhaps more interesting though is the alternative attacking options a change in shape throws up. Adding Jota meant another quick, technical player for Firmino, Mané and Salah to combine with as they tried to break through a defence, however it can also change their roles slightly.
Salah moves in off the wing into a central striking role, which potentially has its benefits by making it more likely that chances in the box fall to him instead of Firmino.
With Salah leading the line ahead of him, Firmino ceases to be a false nine and instead becomes a normal attacking midfielder though. With his tendency to receive the ball with his back to goal, perhaps it would be better for him to be moved out into a wide role. He already drifts wide anyway, has the defensive ability to drop back into the midfield without issue and it would make it easier for him to receive the ball on the half-turn to utilise his dribbling. It would make it harder for him to help Liverpool progress the ball through the middle though, which is arguably what he’s most needed for currently.
Klopp doesn’t have to restrict himself to those four attackers though. Keïta made several appearances on the left wing in a 4-2-3-1 during the winter of 2018-19, asking less of him defensively so he could focus on dribbling and picking out passes, while Wijnaldum was an attacking midfielder before his arrival at Liverpool, introduced as a substitute in an advanced role against Newcastle.
The most obvious alternative is Xherdan Shaqiri. The Swiss has had his own injury problems and even when he’s been fit he’s rarely featured, yet he has the perfect skill-set to break down low blocks. Unlike Firmino, he’s always looking to pick up the ball on the half-turn, enabling him to pick up the ball and immediately dribble at opposition defences, while he has an eye for a through ball to feed his teammates. He showed this perfectly against West Ham, assisting Jota, yet when Liverpool faced the same problem against Newcastle he didn’t come on until injury time when it was already too late.
The one and only time Klopp started Shaqiri at number ten, against Southampton, he was substituted at half-time. “He tried everything, the only problem was defensive,” explained Klopp afterwards. “Offensively, it was a good idea, but we have to work a bit more on that. He was good, I liked it.” Shaqiri’s lack of defensive nous means Klopp has never returned to this option, only giving him rare chances on the right wing or, slightly strangely, in midfield in the 4-3-3. Against teams that aren’t looking to attack though, this becomes less of an issue and Shaqiri could be an excellent choice to break them down.
Takumi Minamino has also struggled to have an influence at Liverpool. He’s a little too similar to Firmino for his own good, seen clearly as a backup or shunted into less suitable positions out wide or in midfield. However, against Crystal Palace Liverpool showed a vision of Minamino and Firmino working in tandem, swapping positions as they work the ball through the centre.
Conclusion
Part of the frustration of Liverpool succumbing to draws against teams they should be beating is that they have made the effort to combat this problem, it just hasn’t worked out for them yet.
The injury crisis hit worst in defence yet Liverpool covered their backline fairly comfortably, it’s instead from an attacking perspective that they have struggled to cope.
Klopp has lost the exact players he needs to be able to claim those victories, but the season continues whether or not he’s ready for it. If Liverpool are going to retain their Premier League crown, he has to come up with a solution.
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