Case Study: Manchester City 1-1 Liverpool 8/11/2020

The two favourites for the title finally met, although neither has sparkled so far this season – a sign of how impressive the rest of the league has become while the Big Six have receded since their collective peak around 2017 to 2018.

Both sides typically use a 4-3-3 formation, but switched to a 4-2-3-1 for this clash. Jurgen Klopp’s solution to his selection headache between Diogo Jota and Roberto Firmino was simply to pick them both, with Curtis Jones making way in midfield, while Joel Matip was fit enough to start in defence, taking Rhys Williams’ spot from the team that thrashed Atalanta in mid-week.

Coming up against the weaker Olympiakos, Pep Guardiola had been able to rest players on Tuesday. Out went John Stones, Nathan Aké, Oleksandr Zinchenko, Phil Foden and Riyad Mahrez and in came Ruben Dias, Aymeric Laporte, Joao Cancelo, Rodri Hernandez and Gabriel Jesus. While Ilkay Gündogan would push forward more than Rodri and Kevin De Bruyne would often drop back alongside them, the shape still resembled more of a 4-2-3-1 than 4-3-3, with De Bruyne pushing up alongside Jesus when defending. This allowed Gündogan to play in the more withdrawn role that suits him better, providing balance to the midfield that freed up De Bruyne to focus on attacking.

City defend in a 4-4-2
City defend in a 4-4-2

At goal kicks Liverpool would push up high against City. Sadio Mané and Jota would line up as Liverpool’s wingers usually do, taking up positions between the centre-backs and full-backs where they can press the centre-backs while blocking the pass out to the full-backs. Mohamed Salah joined Firmino in the centre, holding off to block the passes into midfield.

Liverpool pressed high at goal kicks

Unless the situation arose to trap the full-backs, where Jota and Mané would push up to form a 4-2-4, Liverpool tended to drop off into a mid-block in open play.

At first Gündogan would push higher in the build-up, leaving Rodri alone at the base of the midfield. This enabled Salah and Firmino to take it in turns staying close to Rodri while the other pressed the centre-back on the ball.

Firmino and Salah take it in turns pressing the centre-backs and marking Rodri

This soon changed, with Gündogan dropping back alongside the Spaniard. While Salah and Firmino would still move up to press the centre-backs, they had to be more careful with each responsible for a midfielder, ensuring Laporte and Dias had more time on the ball to pick out passes.

Gündogan drops in alongside Rodri so Salah and Firmino have to pick up a midfielder each
Gündogan drops in alongside Rodri so Salah and Firmino have to pick up a midfielder each

By the end of the half, one of Rodri and Gündogan would frequently drop into the backline, allowing them to spread wider across the pitch.

Rodri drops into the backline, allowing the centre-backs to spread out
Rodri drops into the backline, allowing the centre-backs to spread out

City’s build-up generally seemed to skew more towards the left. This didn’t appear to be a deliberate strategy but simply the result of personnel: left-sided Laporte and Gündogan are better on the ball than Dias and Rodri, while Walker tends to be the full-back expected to hold his position whereas Cancelo is given more freedom to push forward. The build-up saw them pull Liverpool over to their right, opening up a switch of play to Walker in space on the opposite space.

City build up down the left then switch play to Walker in space

It was through this that City equalised. Rodri spread a long ball out to Walker, who was given even more space due to Mané being drawn forward to press Dias, and Georginio Wijnaldum was forced out to meet him, leaving De Bruyne in space inside. Walker picked him out and the Belgian slid a ball through to Jesus to turn and finish.

While City tried their usual patient build-up, Liverpool tended to go direct. With four attackers, they were looking to make use of them by hitting early balls in behind to the forwards testing City’s high line. They were often wasteful, missing the pinpoint accuracy of Virgil van Dijk, but it did nullify City’s high pressure and had Ederson Moraes rushing out of his area to sweep up.

Liverpool hit a long ball in behind

When Liverpool did take a second to put their foot on the ball though, they were often more successful. Both Rodri and Gündogan were being dragged up-field to pick up Jordan Henderson and Wijnaldum, leaving space that both Firmino and Salah were happy to drop into. Pick up the ball here and they could run four-against-four at City’s backline.

Rodri moves up on Henderson, leaving space for Salah and Firmino to drop off and receive the ball

Wary of the threat of Liverpool’s full-backs, City seemed to pay extra attention to them, while Walker also seemed to stick particularly tight to Mané as he drifted around. It didn’t take long for Firmino to work out he could get a bit of space on the left if Mané pulled Walker away from the rest of the backline, while Ferran Torres would also be dragged deep into defence following Andy Robertson’s overlaps.

With Walker sticking close to Mané, Torres tracks Robertson’s run deep

Liverpool still managed to get the opener down this side though – Mané winning a penalty that Salah converted. Torres had tried to block off Robertson’s overlap but the Scot shrugged him off and Walker moved out, expecting a one-two. Mané noticed how far Walker had strayed though and simply turned on the spot, driving into the box. Walker turned quickly but Mané had already knocked the ball past him and, despite trying to pull out, he clipped the Senegalese to concede a foul.

After an open first half, the two sides seemed to settle for a point in the second. Rodri and Gündogan held their positions in front of the defence rather than pushing forward to press, allowing Liverpool to play out but not get at City’s backline.

City’s double pivot hold their position to protect the back four

Klopp also shored up his midfield by replacing Firmino with Xherdan Shaqiri. This didn’t change Liverpool’s shape and the Swiss is a worse defender than the Brazilian, but beforehand Liverpool would have four men ahead of the ball when they attacked, whereas Shaqiri prefers to play in a more withdrawn role. This meant that whenever Liverpool lost the ball he would be behind the play with Henderson and Wijnaldum rather than stood in the box with the other attackers.

Shaqiri stays behind the ball as Liverpool attack
Shaqiri stays behind the ball as Liverpool attack

The two sides’ willingness to play for a point shows they still clearly consider each other their main rivals for the title, unwilling to risk letting the other open up a bigger lead on them even as Leicester City and Tottenham Hotspur pull ahead of them.

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